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By

THEO, HOYER

HB1lB are several rca5Qns that suggest the truce of Passau as
a subject for special consideration at the present time. One is,
of course, the date. Since 1883 we have followed up the great
outstanding events in Reformation history by church-wide celebrations, beginning with Luther's birth and ending, in 1946, with
Luther's death. But several events following Luther's death were
t0 be of immense importance to the Lutheran Church; one of them
is the Schmalkaldic War, ending in the truce of Passau, 1552, and
the Religious Peace of Augsburg. 1555. - Another reason: We
have seen a veritable flood of books on Luther and the Reformation appearing on the market in late years. In most of them this
last period of Reformation history is rapidly passed over. Some of
man even StOp with Worms, 1521. Is there something significant
in this? Up to Worms Luther is every man's hero - then the defeclion begins; one faction after the other deserts him as it becomes
evident what kind of a reformation he initiates. And the writer
faca the obligation of taking a stand: for or against. Others pass
09'r this Section with gentle-or not so gentle- references to
"old Luther," his illness, and other less friendly attempts to explain
bis we years. And yet this period brings the final and inevitable
clash between the old and new and in 1552 leads to the first legal
ammiwion of the Lutheran Church in Germany. It also £urnishcs
the chief reason why the militant phase of the Counter Reformation
muck Germany so late.

T
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Let it be said at once: This article o_ffers nothing new on the
subject- as there is little new information on the whole Reformation story in most of the late treatises; a different approach, a De\\'
emphasis, a new and striking presenmtion of the old story. But a
review of the facts and the meaning of this section of the story may
not be unwelcome.
The story of the Schmalkaldic League really goes back to the first
Diet of Speier, 1526. Luther had been excommunicated by the Pope
and outlawed by the Diet of Worms, 1521. But the Emperor,
Charles V, had to leave Germany at once to meet Francis I of
France, who had invaded imperial domain in North Italy. In the
meantime the Diets of Nuernberg in 1522 and 1524 had not dutd
to enforce the Edict of \Vorms and to mke action against the Evan•
gelicals for fear of precipitating civil war in Germany. But others
were not so ready t0 let matters rest there. The papal legate at
Worms, Aleander, urged Charles to have Luther arrested and destroyed at once, but the Emperor refused. Then the papal legate
at Nuernberg, 1524, Campeggio, instigated a union of Catholic
princes in South Germany, the League of Regensburg, 1524, and
a similar union in North Germany, the League of Dessau, 1525;
both leagues in their constitution made it their object to enforce the
Edict of Worms, to eradicate Lutheranism. That was the first thttat
of force, the beginning of the Church's disr~ption. Purely in defense
against this threat the League of Torgau was formed in 1526. The
Emperor had defeated France; he was coming to the Diet of Speier
to "clean house" in Germany. The outlook was dark for Lutherans.
- Luther was very dubious; he would not give his consent t0 the
Torgau League; to him it smelled of revolution against the govern·
ment.
This time the Pope came to the rescue! -The king of France,
captured by Charles, had been released after he, in the Peace of
Madrid, had taken an oath to keep the peace in future. But the
Pope' released him from this oath and in the League of Cognac
promised him subsidies in money and men to renew the war against
Charles - the Hapsburgs were growing too powerful! And the
Emperor, instead of coming ro Speier, again had to mke the field;
and he knew very well where the real troublemaker lived; he sacked
Rome in 1527.-And in Speier the danger of attack evaporated:
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the Diet adopted the principle, later so famous: "C11i11s f't:gio, rim
rtligio" -until a council could convene, each estate should so act
in the matter of the Edict of Worms that they could answer to God
and the Emperor. In the absence of danger the League of Torgau
bmme inactive.
During the three years between the two Diets of Speier ( 1526
1529) Lutheran mnks spread phenomenally. But again the
Emperor was by that time victorious; the second Diet of Speier.
under pressure of Catholic princes. rescinded the resolution of 1526
and resolved to enforce the Edict of Worms. The Protest of the
Lutheran princes (hence Protestants) was thrown into the imperial
wastebasket and the delegates who delivered it to the Emperor into
prison. At the same time the situation in Switzerland had approached a climax: The Catholic cantons had united against
Z11oingli and had concluded an alliance with Ausuia; they were
tt:ady for war. The Colloquy of Marburg and the attempt. chiefly
fostered by Philip of Hesse and Zwingli, to unite Protestantism
:against Catholic attack, had failed. The Diet of Augsburg, 1530.
resolved to give Lutherans six months' grace, till April 15, 1531;
if by that time they would not return to the old Church voluntarily.
mey were to be forced. Meanwhile they were to leave Catholics
unmolested; they were to aid the Emperor in stamping out the
Zwinglians and the Anabaptists. The Reichsk11mmerge,ich1 ( the
imperial Court of Appeals for all disputed legal cases within the
Empire) was restored; every case of uansfer of property could be
appealed to this court; and by the very nature of this court (its
members were appointed by the Emperor) every such case would
be decided against the dissenters ( the whole Church of Saxony. e.g.•
11.'as supponed by income from old Church property). If the decisions of this court were disregarded. the Emperor could attack them
as violata1 of the constitution of the Empire ( for the Schmalkaldic
War rhe Emperor used just this excuse, among others).
This situation led to the organization of the Schmalkaldic League.
The mm of the Diet of Augsburg was published November 19,
1530. Lutheran princes and delegates of cities met at the little
upland town of Schmalkalden, December 22-31, 1530. The first
maaer 10 be discussed was: What was to be their attitude toward
of the Diet and the probable action of the Emperor:
lO

me raoluaoo
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continue in their pwive resistance or turn to active defense? The
right of resistance was seeded by the lawyers; the Seate of Germany
was really a loose federation of almost independent principalities
and cities; the Emperor was not an absolute ruler, but the Estaccs
ruled with him, and he had only those rights and powers which the
Estates had conferred on him. On legal and constitutional grounds
they questioned the Emperor's right to impose bis will on them in
religious matters. Again: The Diet bad really ~eferred the matter
to a council; the Emperor had promised to use his in8uence with
the Pope to convene a council. Until that council bad considered
the religious differences and reached a decision, the Lutherans held,
the Emperor had no right of execution. Luther, very reluctantly,
gave bis consent.
There has been (shall we say: naturally?) much criticism of
Luther because of this change of opinion; it seemed expedient and
useful to support the Scbmalkaldic League, hence he buried his
scruples and promptly changed his convictions! But isn't it hither
an outstanding example to prove that, as uncompromising and
stubborn as Luther could be when he was convinced he was righr,
he was ready to listen to argument and to change his opinion when
it was brought home to him ( as in this case) that he had been illinformed. In his "Warning to His Dear Germans" (October, 1530)
he still bases bis opinion cbie8y on religious grounds; the con•
stitutional and legal justification of opposition to the Emperor be
leaves to the doetors of Jaw; but if Pope and the hierarchy, without
any authority to do so, take the sword, let them not be surprised
and ay "Rebellion" when they perish by the sword. He for his own
person still prefers passive resistance; he will incite no one to resist;
but let them ·not presume on this; he will not have those ailed
murderers and bloodhounds who resist murderers and bloodhounds;
such resistance is not rebellion; a man is justified in defending his
life and property against a lawless aggressor. If they will have war,
let them have it; but it is on their heads.
Since the doctors of law have established in what cases resistance
to constituted authority is legally permissible, and this cootin•
gency has actually arisen; since, farther, we have :always taught
that the Jaw should funaion and prevail, inasmuch as the Gospel
does not militate against the secular law, we cannot invalidate fiom
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Saipcure the claim to adopt defensive mensures even against the
Emperor or anyone acting in his name. And seeing that the situarioa Im now become so dangerous that events may daily render
such .measures immediately necessary, not only on legal grounds,
bur as a matter of duty and fidelity to conscience, it is fitting to arm

and be prepared against the threatening resort to lawless force.
For in hirherto teaching that it is not permissible to resist consrinum aurhority, we were unaware i:hat the law itself permits such
•
I
ramance.

Mackinnon, who is by no means willing to go with Luther
duough thick and thin, here says:
His inflaming protest against the policy of seeking to decide
this issue by brute force, in order to re-establish the old corrupt
and oppressive system, was fitted to carry conviction over the
length and breadth of the empire. It was one of those prophetic
utterances which, as Randolph said of John Knox's sermons, was

more potent to stir the minds of men than the blast of ten thousand trumpets. It ignores, indeed, the faa that the Emperor nnd
rhe more enlightened seaion of the opposition were not, on principle, hostile to at least a practical reformation of the old papal and
priesrly system. But it certainly was n questionable preliminary
ro such a reformation ro undo by force the reforming work of
Lurher, who could justifiably claim to have challenged and shatreml the evil system which the merely practicnl reformers had in
vain assailed for over a hundred years)!

A 11.'0rd should here be said for Charles V.
The restoration of the unity of the Church became a major concem of the Empire, never forgotten in the midst of others of
greater immediate urgency. He was no obstinate bigot bent on
crushing heresy by force. That was to be a last resort, from which
he was long withheld by lack of means and by political expediency,
bur chiefly because he believed, and continued to believe in spite
of repeated disappointments, that the gulf which threatened to
widen might be bridged by discussion and maybe by compromise.
. • • Not till 1543 did he make up his mind, after all other expedieors had failed, to attempt to crush heresy by force.•
This is right, with the addition that, even in his desire to reunite
a united
Church 10 prop the tottering Empire. In God's hand tha~ relucta~ce
of Omles 10 use his imperial power, to follow the urgent adv1ce

me Oiarcb, Owles had a political object, truly medieval:
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of Rome tO quash the Lutheran movement by force, became one of
the means of saving Lutheranism. By the time Charles was ready
tO use his "last resort," Lutheranism was too strong robe eradicated
by force of arms. In 1531 the Emperor could probably have crushed
the League. But existing conditions prevented it; the Turk \\'as
threatening Vienna, and Charles needed the help of the Evangelical
princes.
After that preliminary meeting in December, 1530, and just
before the time of grace granted them by the Augsburg Diet had
elapsed, while Melanchthon was putting the last touches to that
munpet blast of the Reformation, the Apology, a bond was drafted,
very carefully worded; the Emperor's name was omitted; the causes
for action were only vaguely alluded to. The signers promised to
stand by one another in defense of their faith against the legal proceedings of the Reichsk11mmergerich1 and t0 resist any attempt to
use force against them. It was signed on March 29, 1531, by the
Elecror of Saxony, the I.andgrave of Hesse, the Duke of Lueneburg,
the Prince of Anhalt, the two Counts of Mansfcld, and the representatives of the cities Magdeburg and Bremen.
As a result the Emperor treated the Lutherans very courteously
at the Diet of Nuernberg, 1532; the religious truce was prolonged
indefinitely; all cases against Protestants in the Reichsll11mm,rg•rich1 were to be quashed and no proceeding for religious causes
initiated against any State; and a council was promised within six
months.-The Lutherans assisted the Emperor in the Turkish cam·
paign, in faa, proved tO be more patriotic than the Catholic princes.
Luther declared roundly that the Turk must be met and driven back;
that all Germans must assist the Emperor in this action. The
Turkish invasion was repelled.
The Schmalkaldic League became a real power. In 1534, Philip
of Hesse persuaded it to support the cause of the banished Duke
Ulrich of Wuerttemberg. who had been dispossessed by the Emperor
in 1519 and his land incorporated in the Hapsburg possessions.
Philip easily defeated Ferdinand, the Emperor's brother and regent
(Charles himself was kept busy during this time by pirata on the
Mediterranean). Ulrich was rcsrored, declared in favor of the Ref.
ormation, and Wuerttemberg became Lutheran and, in 1535, joined
the Schmalkaldic League; also Pomerania, Anhalt; the cities of
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Augsburg, Hamburg, Hannover, Kempen, and the South German
tjacs (a union with the South German cities had been arrived at
on the basis of the Wittenberg Concord), Goslar, Goettingen, and
RostOck. In 1539 Duke George of Saxony (perhaps Luther's bitretest enemy, but also the most honest and disinterested of the
Catholic princes), died; and his successor, his brother Henry, with
the joyful consent of his subjeccs, turned the land Lutheran; and
Luther preached in the great hall of the castle in Leipzig, where Eck
had debated with him 20 yenrs before and Duke George had called
his teaching pestilential. The new Elecror of Brandenburg, Joachim,
joined the Schmalkaldic League.
The Schmalkaldic League became an international power. Denmark joined in 1537. France courted the Schmalkaldic League;
Francis I asked Melanchthon to come to France to organize a new
Oiurcb. Heruy VIII of England ousted the Pope and made himself
head of the English Church; for an eventual war with Charles
(because of Henry's divorce from Charles' aunt, Katharine of Aragon) he began ro dicker with the Schmalknldic League for an
alliance. Bavaria, though rapidly proceeding to the leadership
among Catholic States, offered to support the Schmalknldic League
- not because they loved Luther, but because they hated the Hapsburgs. Oeve joined the Schmalkaldic League - and Anne of Cleve
married Henry VIII of England! The three ecclesiastical electors,
the Archbishops of Mainz, Koeln, and Trier, were contemplating
the secularizing of their domains and becoming Protestants; that
alarmed Charles because that threatened a large Protestant majority
in the Eleaoral College and hence a Protestant emperor.
In the meantime the conduct of the Papacy had been disgusting,
evidently subordinating the welfare of the Church to their antiHapsburg schemes; Pope Paul III, allied with Francis, who again
was seeking alliance with the Turk. Charles invaded France and
11."U defeated. Brcslau was fanatically Lutheran. In Vienna, Bishop
Faber said "the population was entirely Lutheran save himself and
the Archduke." Romanist universities were almost without students.
It was said that in Bavaria there were more monasteries than monks.
Peter Paul Vcrgerius reported: There were no candidatc1 for the
primbood, except a few paupers in Bohemia who could not even
pay their ordination fees. The Roman Church seemed to lie in
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the throes of dissolution, even where it had been strongest, and dte
Catholic princes were losing their power. The Emperor and his
brother Ferdinand were considering whether a National German
Church, to be organized by a German National Council (after dte
pattern of England), would not be the best solution.
To sidestep this danger, the Pope finally yielded to the pressure
of the Emperor, the Diers, and the Lutherans and called a council,
but it was merely for show, to forestall possible action of dte Em•
peror. He sent delegates to the powers to ask where they wanted
the council to assemble. The almost universal answer was: Not in
Italy. So he called it to Italy! To Mantua. (Cp. the Historical In·
troduction to the Smalcald Articles, the visit of Legate Vergcrius in
Wittenberg, Trig/01111, p.47.) The council never mer; only a fe\\'
bishops came.
The
of the general situation, and prominently the influence
threat
of the man who up to this time dominated the policy of the papal
Curia, Cardinal Conmrini, a poHcy of conciliation, led to the union
conferences at Hagenau (June, 1540), Worms (November, 1540),
and Regensburg (April, 1541), the Inst attempt at a compromise.
The outcome only proved that while union formulas could be con•
struaed, there was a great gulf between the two parties which Prot•
estants would not cross; and the Catholics balked at articles on
transubstantiation and the Mass, the divine primacy of the Pope, the
universal priesthood of believers, the infallibility of councils. And
Charles finally saw that Lutherans would nor return unless com·
pelled by force. -The final impulse toward this method of settling
the controversies was perhaps given by the results of the Emperor's
efforts ( since 1521 ) to persuade ( or force) the Pope to call a
council where the two parties could be brought together for dte
purpose of discussing the differences. By 1542 he and the Pope h:id
settled the place; the Pope had insisted on a city in Imly; the Ger•
man estates demanded a council in Germany. As a compromise,
Trent was picked, a city on the border of Italy and Ausuia (though
a totally Italian city). A campaign against France intervened; bur
after the Peace of Crespy, November 19, 1544, the Pope issued a
call for the Council of Trent to convene in March, 1545. But ar
the same time the Pope ( against the definitely expressed will of
the Emperor) issued secretly a program for the council which made
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it impossible for Prorestants to attend: Only Catholic bishops in
good anding could vote (a first stipulation denied Protestants
even the right to speak; but later this was changed) ; nothing settled
in the Catholic Confutation of .Augsburg ( i. e., everything contained
in the Augsburg Confession) should be discussed; Protestants
should promise in advance to submit to the resolutions of the council
"•ithoutquestion. -The Emperor saw no possibility of reconciliation by means of the council; unity could be restored only by force.
His correspondence with his sister Mary and his brother Ferdinand
shov.'S that by the middle of 1545 he had reached that decision.
Bur force he could not use unless the Schmalknldic le:lgue was
broken up. For this purpose the Emperor used that most unforruoate aa, the bigamy of Philip of Hesse, and the jealousy and
21Dhition of Maurice of Saxony.
Since 1526 Philip had urged Luther to grant his consent to a
scconcl marriage; it was denied. But finally, December 10, 1539,
after Bucer had brought Luther a secret confession of Philip, he
lOgahcr with the faculty of Wittenberg gave their consent to a
s«rcr second marriage of Philip. - Jacobs ·1 calls this "the greatest
blunder in Luther's career." It is difficult not to agree with him.
Despite the never revealed secrets of Philip's confession there seems
t0 be no excuse for this; explanation, yes, but no justificuion. Bur
chat is a different chapter.G Here this must suffice: Since 1532 imperial law declared bigamy the same as adultery, a capital crime;
and Philip himself had published the law in Hesse and subscribed
t0 it. Of course, Philip's second marriage could not be kept secrer;
his second mother-in-law saw to that. .And Charles jumped :it the
opportunity. A trial case offered. Charles claimed that a treaty had
coofemd the rule of Gelderland on him after the death of the
praent sovereign, the Duke of Cleve. But when the old Duke died,
his son William ( who was the brother-in-law of the Elector of
Suony) succeeded him. Here was a powerful anti-Hapsburg Seate,
bada:d by the Schmalkaldic League, next to Hapsburg Netherlands.
The Emperor offered Philip immunity for past crimes and advancement in the Emperor's service if he would see to it that the Duke
of Cleve was not supported by the Schmalkaldic League against
die Emperor; and Philip, humiliated by the criticism of his friends,
ilDlaced. shunned by them, was a ready tool for the Em~r•s h:inds
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to weaken the Schmalkaldic league. Duke Maurice of Saxony (son
and successor of Henry, who had died in 1541) was the son-in-law
of Philip and joined him. But the Elector of Saxony would not
desert his brother-in-law. So the Schmalkaldic League w:as split.
In 1543 the Emperor totally def~ted Cleve and rook the land; and
the Proresranrs, hindered by Philip, had to sec a powerful ally overrqrown. Mutual recriminations grew; and when the Emperor was
ready to attack the Schmalkaldic League, it was not difficult to
persuade the Elector of Brandenburg and others to keep our of
the mess.
Meanwhile the Emperor worked on Maurice. He promised
Maurice the Electorate in place of the present Elector; he was to
add Magdeburg and Halbcrstadt to his domain; and neither he nor
his people should be subject to the decrees of the Council of Trent
- Maurice is one of the most perplexing characters in Reformation
history. There is no reason to doubt that he became a Lutheran by
conviction and adhered to that faith to the end; yet he more than
anyone else is responsible for the overthrow of his associates in the
Schmalka.ldic League. TI1cn he became the chief instrument for
the restoration of Lutheranism, of securing its public recognition
and, in the Religious Peace of Augsburg, 1555, its permanent accreditation, though he died before that dace. Lindsay here inscns
an interesting note: 0
A man's deep religious conviaions can tolerate smmgc company
in most ages. and the fact that we find Romanist champions in
France plunging into the deepest profligacy the one week and then
undergoing the agonies of repentance the next, or that Luthemi
leaders combined occasional conjugal in.fidelities and drinking
bouts with zeal for evangelical principles, demands dccpcr srudy
in psychology than can find expression, in the fashion of some
modern English historians, in a few cheap sneers.
War began soon after Luther's death. The time was auspicious.
Charles had concluded the Peace of Crespy with France, leaving bis
English ally in the lurch. Nevertheless, Henry VIII had definitely
declared for Catholicism in his Six Articles. The Turks had agreed
to a truce. The Pope had been forced to call the Council of Trent.
-On July 20, 1546, the Emperor proclaimed the ban of the Em-

pire against Philip of Hesse nnd John Frederick of Saxony, because
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they bad repudiated the Reichsk11nimergerich11 protested against the
Diet's rcmses, denied the authority of General Councils and of the
Emperor himself; tO which the Pope added their refusal to acknowledge rhe Council of Trent
In spite of the fact that Charles had induced the Elcet0r of Brandenburg and several other princes to remain neutral, the Schmalladdie League had an army of 50,000 men and 7,000 horse at
Donauwoerth on the Danube. Prompt offensive action on their
part \\'Ould probably have ended the war in a short time. But the
lade of unity and chronic mutual suspicion interfered (every action
of military commanders had to be reported to, and sanctioned by,
the headquarters of the league beforehand) . They failed to inrercq,t the Emperor's Spanish and Italian troops entering on the
south-for fear of antagonizing Bavaria. Then they allowed the
Emperor's forces from the Netherlands to cross Germany and join
the other troops with very little hindrance.
Then, while they were holding the Emperor in check in the south,
Maurice and Ferdinand raided the land of the Elector of Saxony.
That effectually broke up the army of the league. It forced the
Elcet0r with the main pare of the league's army to hasten co the rescue of his own land- enabling Charles to impose terms on the
southern cities ( except Constance), on the Elector of the Palatinate,
Wumtemberg, and others. In the meantime, John Frederick had
not only reconquered his own land, but had taken most of Maurice's
Ducal Saxony. But Philip's indecision (he was negotiating for a
feasible peace) enabled Charles to move northward rapidly. On
April 24, 1547, he routed the Saxon army; took the Elector prisoner; sentenced him to death as a traitor; deprived him of his land,
chiefly in favor of Maurice; he was kept a prisoner in the camp
before Wittenberg and forced to sign the capitulation of the city
which had been ably defended by his wife; she surrendered it to save
his life. Philip was induced to surrender by a promise of personal
b1,eny given by Maurice and the Elector of Brandenburg, which,
bov.-ever, was repudiated by the Emperor; perhaps he had never
authorized it
It seemed u though all Germany lay at the Emperor's feet. But
it soon became evident that politically he was not much monger
than before. His victory over the Lutherans was a victory for the
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Hapsburgs; and the princes were at once "on guard" against the
Hapsburg desire for centralization of power in opposition to the
territorial jurisdiction of the nobility. At the Diet of Augsburg,
September, 1547, they blocked Charles' attempt t0 make the Empire
a reality with an organized military force ( they wanted no Spanish
veterans in Germany! ) ; to stamp out Lutheranism ( they wanted
no Spanish Inquisition in Germany! ) ; he could not even make use
of the Council for that purpose; the Pope had removed the Council
from Trent to Bologna in March, 1547, for the very purpose of
keeping it out of the Emperor's hand and subject to his own mastery,
and despite Charles' demands he refused to restore it to Trcnr. In
.fucr, the. Pope "had been praying and intriguing, for politial and
papal reasons, for the success of the Eleccor against the Emperor"
( Mackinnon). Charles had to go his own way.
The result was the attempt to force Charles' own idea of a Confession on Protestant Germany. Like a second Justinian, he appointed Michael Helding, a medieval Catholic; Julius von Pflug.
an Erasmian; Agricola, Luther's old antagonist, now court preacher
of Joachim II of Brandenburg, to construct the document that came
co be known as the Augsburg Interim. It retained the Episcopal
the seven sacraments, the Mass, rhe intercession and merits
of the saints; it surrendered the absolute supremacy of the Pope
over the Church; conceded t0 Lutherans clericnl marriage and Communion in both kinds; it "split the dilference" in the docuine of
justification; in face, all doctrinal statements were ambiguouswere intended t0 be so! He defied Pope and Council; when the
Pope refused tO resrore it t0 Trent, he protested against its existence
and declared he would not be bound by it.
"Nothing that Charles ever underrook proved such a dismal failure as this patchwork creed made from snippets from rwo Confessions. However lifeless creeds may become, they all -real oneshave grown out of the living Christian experience of their framers
and have contained the very lifeblood of their beans as well as their
brains. It is a hopeless task t0 construct creeds as a tailor shapes
and stitches coats." 1
But Charles was proud of it. It was t0 stand, pending the final
decision of the council. It was dubiously accepted by the Diet,
May 15, 1548.-Three days lacer Maurice brought in his prorest:
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He md been promised that his land was not to be subjected to such
a change; moreover, his cousin, John Frederick, and his father-inlav.•, Philip. were still in prison; but Charles had promised not to
imprison them; he had it black on white! - Here enters the dispurc:d case of the document referred to: Maurice claimed the Emperor had guaranteed that they should not be kept "in eeniger
Haft"; but when brought forth it read: "in ewiger Haft." Was it
forged, or did Maurice fail to read it right? Historians are still .
debating the question.8 But Maurice was permitted to change the
Augsburg Interim into the Leipzig Interim, December, 1548 ( "for
v.•hich the pusillanimous Melanchthon was largely responsible, and
\\'hich gave away much that Luther had contended for, except the
doarine of Justification by Faith," Mackinnon).
Theo Pror:est:mts found that the Interim was to be enforced on
rhcm only, not on Catholics. It was imposed on the South German
cities despite Charles' definite promise of roleration. Constance was
besieged and fell; was deprived of all imperial privileges and added
ro the Hapsburg possessions. 400 pastors were driven from their
homes; many soupt refuge in exile; Bucer and Fagius went to
England. Churches stood empty. Everywhere in Protestant Germany there was passive resistance - "if singing doggerel verses,
publishing satirical songs. pamphlets, even catechisms, carroons, with
an immense circulation, can be called passive." - Duke Christopher
of Wumtembcrg was ordered to exile Brenz; he answered that he
could not banish his entire population. Many of the North German
princes and cities refused to accept the Interim. The example of
the imprisoned John Frederick, who decisively rejected it, stalled
the opposition. leaders were Amsdorf, Flacius, Erasmus Alberus,
Nicolas Gallus. From Magdeburg ( "unsers Herrgotts Knnzlei")
they kept up a strenuous and persistent pen warfare. - Charles'
crml became a dead letter in mo~t of Germany.
There was added opposition to the Emperor on personal and national grounds. The continued imprisonment of Philip was resented
by Maurice. The general soreness was aggravated by the continued
presence of Spanish soldiers and ministers in Germany, despite repeated promises to remove them. The renewed effom of Charles to
make the imperial crown hereditary in his family aroused apprehension; he had failed to have his son, the later Philip II, elected as his
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successor; the Diet had eleaed his brother Ferdinand. Now Charles
proposed to make his son the successor of his brother, instead of Ferdinand's son Maximilian, who was reputed to be favorably dispased
toward Protestants. Added to this was the insolence of Spanish uoops
in enforcing the Interim; citizens were told: if they did not accept ir,
they must be taught theology by Spanish soldiers; or, They would
yet learn the language of Spain. In the background threatened the
dread specter of the Spanish Inquisition. Despite Charles' continued
presence in Germany, anarchy increased. Revolt would have come
sooner if Protestants had not suspected and hated Maurice. Charles'
foreign prestige was waning. France and England had made peace;
either one of the two was free to contemplate a move against himand both had sufficient provocation. England was worried; Edward VI was declining rapidly; everybody knew Mary Tudor's
feelings toward Protestants and, when she succeeded Edward, what
she was sure to do - under Charles' advice. Charles had several
times defeated France; France might try to cake revenge. The Turk
was on the warpath again.
Maurice, pure opportunist, had played the traitor to Protestantism
because it paid him; now it was the Emperor's turn. It will be
remembered that Maurice had received Magdeburg and Halberstadt
in that ill-famed deal. But Magdeburg had persistently refused to
accept the Interim, and Maurice laid siege to the city. But while
the siege and fall of this city (November 9, 15 51), purely because
it refused to bow to religious tyranny, is a final item to be charged
against Maurice, it is evident that he himself now became thoroughly alarmed, not only at the vicious way in which Owles
wreaked his vengeance on the two imprisoned princes, but chiefty
at the arbitrary manner in which he was proceeding to carry our
his political aims. While he was ostensibly engaged with the siege
of Magdeburg, he plotted with William of Hesse, son of Philip,
who stood ready to avenge the wrong done to his father; with Hans
of Kuesuin, Albert of Brandenburg-Culmbach, and John Albert
of Mecklenburg against the Emperor. He negotiated an active alli•
ance with Henry II of France (Treaty of Chambord and Fredewald,
January-February, 1552) which ceded Metz, Toul, and Venlun
to France, in return for which Henry invaded Lorraine. Maurice
and his confederates suddenly turned on the Emperor, who in utter
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self-confidence was resting at the spa in Innsbruck; when he awoke
ro the danger, it was too late to resist; too late to escape northward
(the logical way, through the Netherlands by sea to Spain);
Maurice had even begun to block the passes to Italy; if it had not
been for a mutiny in his army, which delayed him a few hours,
1'faurice would have accomplished what he set out to do, "to run
die old fox to eard1" - Charles would have been a prisoner. As it
was, in a liner, in darkness and storm, he escaped ( "in Hemd und
Suuempfen") over the Brenner Pass to Villach (May 18-19,
1552). "It was the road by which he had entered Germany in fair
spring weather when he came in 1530, in the zenith of his pcwer,
to settle, as he had confidently expected, the religious difficulties
in Germany." In Villach he awaited the issue, it seems not particularly downcast, but rather disgruntled; he was a Hapsburg, which
was a synonym for stubbornness and the conviction that God had
established the "divine right of kings" as a special prerogative of
the Hapsburgs. -The Fathers of Trenr, fearing Maurice's advance,
took to the bushes!
But the victors stopped short of revolution. No wish to depose
the fugitive Emperor was voiced; they were ready to negotiate
through Ferdinand. In great numbers the princes gathered in Passau
in August. Maurice was master of the situation; his rroops and those
of his "wild ally," Albert Alcibiades of Brandenburg-Culmbach,
filled the town, and the assembled princes were uneasy; someone
said that many a prince felt "as if they had a hare in their breast."
But Maurice was sensible and conservative; his demands were mod- •
crate and statesmanlike, aimed at the public good. He asked for the
release of his father-in-law Philip; for a permanent settlement of
the religious question by a meeting of German princes fairly representative of the two parties- no Council summoned and directed
by the Pope, he held, would ever give fair play to the Protestants,
nor could they expect to get it from the Diet because the large
number of ecclesiastical members gave the Romanist side an undue
preponderance- and in this he voiced the conviction of all Protestant and some of the other princes. They adopted what became
known as· the Treaty of Passau; the imprisoned princes were to be
liberated and restored; the Interim was canceled; total religious
liberty was tO be granted until the religious differences could be
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settled by a Diet. This agreement Charles signed. The additional
demand that the religious peace should continue even if the Diet
should fail t0 achieve religious unity he refused; obstinately be held
ro the supremacy of the Diet. Perhaps he still counted on the divi•
sions among the Protestants, thought he could break up this alliance
of princes by intrigue, by supporting the "born Elector" against the
one whom he himself had created, Maurice. .And Maurice himself
perhaps feared this; he was satisfied when the "born Elector," John
Frederick, consented tO the transfer of the electorate to Maurice.
This gave Maurice the additional satisfaction of showing his fellov.•
nobles that the "Spaniard" was the only foe of a lasting peace in
Germany.
Charles returned ro .Augsburg, where "he had the petty satisfaction of threatening the Lutheran preachers who had returned, and
of again overthrowing the democrntic government of the city"
(Lindsay). The inveterate Hapsburg! But then, in the attempt to
reconquer Metz, he failed miserably against the defense of the cit)•
by Francis of Guise; that finally filled him with such disgust that he
left all German affairs ro his brother and devoted the rest of his
active life ro Spain, where he had been more successful; he had
managed ro separate the Netherlands from the Empire and unite
them with Spain; his son Philip had married Mary Tudor, Queen
of England; hence Spanish ships could henceforth freely use the
English Channel and "the harbors and roads of interior Europe"
ending in the Low Countries; a combination which made for world
domination! It failed because of one Elizabeth who had her own
mind and ambitions-but that, roo, is another story; Charles did
not know that.
Disorders of the times delayed the assembling of a Diet. The old
Elector died March 3, 1554, worn out by misfortune and imprisonment. Maurice was killed in a campaign against former fellow con·
spiraror .Albert of Culmbach, at Sievershausen, July 9, 1553-only
32 years old. The Diet met February-September, 1555, and there,
in the Religious Peace of .Augsburg, made the stipulations of the
Treaty of Passau law in Germany. The Peace of .Augsburg, to0, had
faults which later on led ro greater uouble; but it gave ro the Lutheran Church its first legal accreditation in Germany; it assun:d
peace ro Germany until it was drawn inro the n1irty Years' War,
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, ·hich swted in Bohemia, while other lands were being tortured
by religious wars, ~ result of the Counter Reformation. And the
lODe for the Augsburg Peace was set by the Treaty of Passau.
Sr. louis, Mo.
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